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ILLIQUIDITY EFFECTS IN OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION-INVESTMENT
PROBLEMS
MICHAEL LUDKOVSKI† AND HYEKYUNG MIN
Abstract. We study the effect of liquidity freezes on an economic agent optimizing her utility of
consumption in a perturbed Black-Scholes-Merton model. The single risky asset follows a geometric
Brownian motion but is subject to liquidity shocks, during which no trading is possible and stock
dynamics are modified. The liquidity regime is governed by a two-state Markov chain. We derive
the asymptotic effect of such freezes on optimal consumption and investment schedules in the two
cases of (i) small probability of liquidity shock; (ii) fast-scale liquidity regime switching. Explicit
formulas are obtained for logarithmic and hyperbolic utility maximizers on infinite horizon. We
also derive the corresponding loss in utility and compare with a recent related finite-horizon model
of Diesinger, Kraft and Seifried (2010).
1. Introduction
The theory of optimal investment has been one of the cornerstones of the modern mathematical
finance. Working in the context of the Black-Scholes model of a single risky asset, Merton (1971) in
his seminal work obtained closed-form expressions for optimal investment and consumption strate-
gies of an agent with power-utility preferences. These results relied on the fundamental assumptions
of frictionless and continuous trading. In the past thirty five years, extensive efforts have been de-
voted to reconciling this assumption with real financial markets. A large body of literature (see e.g.
the textbook Karatzas and Shreve (1998) and references therein) treats optimal investment with
(either proportional or fixed) transaction costs; another significant strand addresses optimal invest-
ment with discrete trading times (Rogers, 2001; Rogers and Zane, 2002; Pham and Tankov, 2008;
Matsumoto, 2006; Cretarola et al., 2010). Finally, several authors considered optimal investment-
consumption models under stochastic volatility (Fleming and Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez, 2003; Fouque et al.,
2000; Ba¨uerle and Rieder, 2004).
Recently, the issue of illiquid financial markets has been considered. From one direction, sev-
eral authors (C¸etin and Rogers, 2007; C¸etin et al., 2004) have analyzed optimal investment by
a large trader whose actions affect the dynamics of the market. From a different perspective,
Diesinger et al. (2010) have treated markets where trading may be interrupted. The latter phe-
nomenon means that during times of crisis markets freeze and often no trading is possible at all,
no matter the price. Thus, during major financial dislocations, trading halts and circuit-breakers
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are implemented to alleviate panic. These shutdowns typically follow a major market drop and
are often triggered by the index losing a preset percent of its value within a single trading ses-
sion. For instance, on October 28, 1997 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) experienced two
circuit-breakers once the Dow Jones index lost 5% and then 7.5% percent of its value. In each
case, trading was halted for an hour. More recently, during the 2008 financial crisis, the Russian
RSX exchange was closed by government decree for three days during Sep 20-23, 2008. Many other
emerging market bourses in Brazil, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, etc., also faced repeated halts for
parts or all of a trading session in September-October 2008. Similarly, after the 9/11 attacks in
2001, the NYSE was closed for four days. On many of the smaller national exchanges, investors
must contend with regular trading halts due to political, regulatory and financial upheavals.
More lengthy interruptions have been witnessed during times of war. In the 1940s, the Zurich
stock exchange closed for over a month in May 1940; the Frankfurt stock exchange was closed for
5 months in 1945. At the onset of World War I the NYSE was closed from July 31, 1914 until
November 28, 1914 (Diesinger et al., 2010). Moving away from stocks, lengthy liquidity freezes are
commonplace in more exotic asset classes. The recent credit crisis is a case in point; 2007-2008 saw
major liquidity crises in US sub-prime mortgage backed securities (MBS), Canadian asset backed
commercial paper (ABCP) and worldwide collaterized debt obligations (CDOs). The collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led to several months of virtual shutdown in trading of credit
products and there were many anectodal stories of investors unable to sell their “toxic” assets at
any price.
The effect of such liquidity crises on optimal investment is threefold. First, inability to rebalance
the portfolio during the interruption reduces the long-run utility of the agent. Second, liquidity
crises are commonly accompanied by major market drops (cf. Russia in 2008, US in 2001, Germany
in 1945) which lead to significant unavoidable losses for the agent. Third, during a trading inter-
ruption, agents are unable to liquidate their holdings to finance consumption. Thus, agents may
experience shortage of funds and are forced to dramatically curtail their consumptions while their
investments are frozen. This was widely documented in the mass media in autumn of 2008 and
was one of the major mechanisms of the transmission of the financial crisis into the real economy.
In this paper we investigate the effect of such trading interruptions on the optimal investment
and consumption strategies of a power-utility agent. We maintain the Black-Scholes model for the
risky asset and the assumption of frictionless trading outside of the liquidity event. By keeping our
setup identical to the classical Merton model except for the feature of liquidity freezes, we are able
to draw clear comparisons to the original benchmark.
Because historically major liquidity crises have been rare events, we undertake asymptotic analy-
sis of the effect of illiquidity on optimal strategies. Indeed, due to their rarity, statistical estimation
of the frequency of liquidity crises is fraught with difficulties and the corresponding model parameter
cannot be well calibrated. One of our contributions are closed-form formulas for the first-order cor-
rections to the classical Merton solutions for power-utility agents. These formulas show the impact
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of the liquidity crises frequency and duration and provide simple rules of thumb for the investors.
Similar asymptotic expansions for other models of liquidity were undertaken in Rogers and Zane
(2002) and Matsumoto (2006).
An alternative viewpoint is that liquidity crises are commonplace but have a very short dura-
tion. Mathematically, this means that liquidity is a fast-scale process, modulating the slow-scale
geometric Brownian motion model of the risky asset. Such theory of fast-scale hybrid diffusions
was developed by Il’in et al. (1999b,a). The effect of fast-scale stochastic volatility on optimal
investment-consumption was studied by Ba¨uerle and Rieder (2004) in a regime-switching volatility
model and by Fouque et al. (2000) in a diffusion setting. The key observation is that the singu-
lar perturbation of the HJB equations requires averaging of the Sharpe ratios rather than of the
volatilities themselves. Our results below (fully explicit for the logarithmic and hyperbolic utilities)
complement this analysis; in particular our perturbation is of a new type since the trading control
is only active in one regime. On a practical level, this homogenized model allows investors to adjust
their strategies to account for a fast-scale friction in the market.
Our model is closest to the recent work of Diesinger et al. (2010). In the latter work, which was
one of the inspirations for our research, the authors consider a model with similar motivations and
techniques. Following their setup, we treat liquidity as a two-state Markov chain which modulates
the market dynamics and imposes constraints on the trading strategies. While Diesinger et al.
(2010) work on a finite horizon and study maximization of terminal utility, we instead focus on an
optimal consumption model on infinite horizon. Also, Diesinger et al. (2010) do not carry out any
asymptotic analysis and do not treat fast-scale liquidity. An earlier study of illiquidity effects was
carried out by Schwartz and Tebaldi (2006) who considered optimal investment where the liquidity
shock times are known in advance. Finally, our use of a finite-state Markov chain to modulate
the investment regimes also resonates with regime-switching models of optimal investment, see
Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009); Zariphopoulou (1992).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a formal description of our hybrid
diffusion market model and the optimization problem for the investor. Section 3 provides the
solution for a log-utility maximizing investor. Section 4 repeats the analysis for a general investor
with HARA utility; in particular Section 4.2 provides explicit solutions for the case of hyperbolic
utility; also implicit formulas are obtained for square-root and inverse-square-root utilities. All these
analytical results are illustrated with several numerical examples in Section 5. In Section 6 we study
the fast-scale limit of our illiquidity model and its effect on optimal investment and consumption.
Section 7 extends to a finite-horizon setting where we consider a log-utility maximizing agent, as
well as provide the asymptotic analysis of the terminal log-utility maximizer of Diesinger et al.
(2010). Finally, Section 8 concludes.
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2. Market with Regime-Switching Liquidity
Let (Mt) be a two-state continuous Markov chain with infinitesimal generator
Q =
(
−λ01 λ01
λ10 −λ10
)
.
Associated with M are two Poisson processes N01 and N10 with intensity rates of λ01 and λ10
respectively. The process Ni,1−i, i ∈ {0, 1} can be viewed as a counting process for the number of
transitions ofM between state i and 1−i. Thus,M has the representation dMt = 1{Mt−=0}dN01(t)−
1{Mt−=1}dN10(t).
The process M is a proxy for the market liquidity. When Mt = 0, the market is liquid and the
usual Black-Scholes model for the risky asset (henceforth called ‘stock’) price applies:
dSt = µSt dt+ σSt dWt,(1)
with (Wt) a one-dimensional Wiener process on a stochastic basis (Ω,F ,P). When Mt = 1, the
market is illiquid; the stock is non-traded and its price experiences a deterministic exponential
growth at rate α ≤ r:
dSt = αSt dt.
Moreover, at the times of transition from Mt− = 0 to Mt = 1, the stock price experiences an
instantaneous drop of L%, St = (1 − L)St−. This jump represents the abrupt decrease in stock
price due to a catastrophic market event (such as 9/11 in the USA, collapse of Lehman Brothers,
etc.). Overall, the stock obeys a hybrid jump-diffusion model
dSt = ~µMtSt dt+ ~σMtSt dW (t)− LSt1{Mt−=0}dN01(t),(2)
with ~µ = [µ, α]T , ~σ = [σ, 0]T .
2.1. Wealth Dynamics. We consider an economic agent who solves an optimal investment-
consumption problem in this regime-switching market. Namely, at any given date t the agent
(i) invests a fraction πt of her total wealth in the stock; (ii) invests the remainder of her wealth
in a bank account paying interest at fixed rate r; (iii) consumes at rate ct per unit time. We
make the additional assumption that consumption is only financed through cash. This introduces
an additional cash crunch constraint whereby the agent may run out of money to consume during
an illiquidity shock.
Denote by (Xt) the total wealth of the agent at date t. Then (Xt) evolves according to
dXt
Xt
= r(1− πt) dt+ πt dSt
St
− ct
Xt
dt
= (r − ct
Xt
) dt+ 1{Mt−=0}
{
πt(µ − r) dt+ πtσ dW (t)− Lπt dN01(t)
}
+ 1{Mt−=1}πt(α− r) dt.(3)
The instantaneous jump of size L in the asset price at the beginning of a liquidity shock has a
double effect: it decreases overall wealth, and also increases the fraction of money held in cash,
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mitigating the cash crunch. Overall, if today’s wealth is Xt− with a proportion πt− held in stock,
an instantaneous downward jump of L% in the stock price causes the total wealth to decrease to
Xt = ((1 − πt−L)Xt− and the fraction invested in S to shrink to πt = g(πt−) where
g(π) ,
π(1− L)
(1− πL) .
Note that g(·) is an increasing convex function from [0, 1] onto [0, 1] which reduces to the identity
map g(π) = π when L = 0.
Remark 1. Our model can be straightforwardly extended to the case where the jumps of S at
transition times of M have an arbitrary discrete distribution fL(·) which is bounded away from
1 (and such that its realizations are independent of the rest of the model). All the results below
would continue to hold in that case after replacing with g(π) = π(1 − E[L]) (1− πE[L])−1. We
maintain constant jump sizes for ease of notation and interpretation.
In contra-distinction from the classical Merton setting, the number of shares πtXt/St held by the
investor has liquidity constraints. Namely, admissible trading strategies are required to maintain
the above quantity constant on the time intervals whereMt = 1. This represents market illiquidity
whereby the agent is completely unable to trade stock, and corresponds to exogenously given
dynamics of πt when Mt = 1. To make sure the agent does not go bankrupt, the constraint
πt ∈ [0, 1] is imposed. Thus, no short-sales or leveraged positions are allowed. Conditional on
Mt = 1, the dynamics of (πt) are (cf. (Diesinger et al., 2010, Lemma 2.1))
dπt = πt[(1− πt)(α − r) + ct/Xt] dt,(4)
where the second term represents the increase in proportion of wealth in stock due to consumption
that is paid for with cash.
Our aim is to quantify the effect of market illiquidity on optimal consumption/investment. In
particular, two asymptotic regimes are of interest. First, the case λ01 being small represents a
marginal possibility of liquidity breakdown. Observe that with λ01 = 0 and M0 = 0 we recover
the classical Merton problem. Therefore, the asymptotics of the limit λ01 → 0 can be viewed as a
regular perturbation of this model that takes into account the agent’s response to illiquidity.
Second, a homogenized limiting model is obtained by re-scaling the generator Q of M to be
Qǫ , Qǫ for ǫ ≪ 1. This represents a market that exhibits a fast scale of liquidity regimes that
impose additional constraints on the trading agent. In other words, both λ01 and λ10 are large,
with a fixed ratio λ¯ , λ10λ01+λ10 representing the proportion of time spent in liquid regime. We also
rescale the jumps as L(ǫ) = L¯ǫ which in the limit becomes a negative drift on the stock. In the
limit ǫ→ 0 we obtain a singular perturbation of the original Black-Scholes model. Such singularly
perturbed hybrid diffusions with fast switching were studied by Il’in et al. (1999b).
Remark 2. In the classical Merton problem with strictly positive consumption, the only constraint
on trading is no short-sales, πt ≥ 0. With liquidity freezes, we have the additional no-leveraging
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constraint πt ≤ 1. Thus, even as λ01 → 0 or ǫ → 0 above, if πˆ > 1 our value functions do not
converge to the original Merton solutions. Consequently, in markets with large Sharpe ratios, a
liquidity gap would be present even with negligible chance of market freeze. See Section 3.2 and
Remark 4 below.
2.2. Consumption on Infinite Horizon. As our main model, we consider an agent maximizing
cumulative utility of consumption on infinite horizon. We assume that consumption is absolutely
continuous, so that we can define a consumption rate ct with respect to the Lebesgue measure on
R+. The objective function is then given in terms of time-additive utility of consumption,
sup
(π,c)∈A
E
x
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(ct) dt
]
,(5)
where ρ > 0 is the inter-temporal substitution factor for consumption and u : R+ → R is the strictly
concave utility function satisfying the Inada conditions limx↓0 u
′(x) = +∞, limx→+∞ u′(x) = 0. In
(5), the expectation is with respect to measure Px conditional on initial endowment X0 = x. Below
we will focus on the case of Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA, also known as CRRA or
constant relative risk aversion) utilities, u(x) = x
γ
γ with γ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) and u(x) = log x
for γ = 0. With HARA utilities, investment proportions are known to be independent of current
wealth which also carries over to our model and simplifies the interpretation of our results.
Admissible strategies for (5) are defined as follows. The observable filtration is always F =
(Ft) generated jointly by S and M . The investment process (πt) is required to be an F-adapted
process with E[
∫ t
0 π
2
s ds] < ∞ for any t < ∞. Next, we also require that (ct) be F-adapted with
E[
∫∞
0 e
−ρt|u(ct)| dt] <∞. In the case where u(0) = −∞, ruin is infinitely costly and therefore any
admissible strategy must additionally satisfy P(πt < 1) = P(Xt > 0) = 1 for any t <∞. We denote
by A0 the set of all admissible trading strategies that satisfy the above constraints, and finally
by A ⊆ A0 the subset given in (5) that in addition satisfies the freeze constraint during liquidity
shocks expressed in (4).
To solve (5), we employ the usual Dynamic Programming paradigm. Denote by V 0(x) the value
function of the agent with initial wealth endowment of x and conditional on M0 = 0; similarly
denote by V 1(π, x) the value function of an agent with an endowment of x and a fraction π of
her wealth in stock, conditional on M0 = 1. Standard stochastic control arguments suggest the
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following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation

sup
c≥0
{
−ρV 1 + (x(r + (α− r)π)− c)V 1x + π(1− π)(α− r)V 1π + πc/xV 1π
+ λ10(V
0(x)− V 1(π, x)) + u(c)
}
= 0,
sup
π∈[0,1],c≥0
{
−ρV 0 + (x(r + (µ− r)π)− c)V 0x +
1
2
x2π2σ2V 0xx
+ λ01(V
1(
π(1 − L)
1− πL , (1− πL)x)− V
0(x)) + u(c)
}
= 0,
lim
x↓0
V 1(π, x) = u(0), and lim
x↓0
V 0(x) = u(0),
(6)
In the illiquid regime 1 only consumption can be optimized; the liquidity shock expires at rate
λ10 and once it is over liquid trading resumes and remaining utility will then be V
0(x). In the
meantime, the fraction invested in stock evolves according to (4) and total wealth Xt according to
(3). Analogously, starting in the liquid regime the agent optimizes the positive fraction of wealth
invested in the stock and consumption. All the while she is anticipating the possibility of liquidity
shocks that occur at rate λ01 and entail immediate loss of L% in the stock value. The different
dynamics of (Xt) under the two liquidity regimes lead to modified derivative terms with respect to
x in (6).
We now state the following verification theorem; the proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Suppose that J0(x) ∈ C2(R+), J1(π, x) ∈ C1,1(R+×[0, 1)) are two smooth functions
with polynomial growth in x that satisfy the HJB equation (6). Then J0(x) ≥ V 0(x), J1(π, x) ≥
V 1(π, x). Moreover, if there exist continuous functions π∗, c0,∗, c1,∗ satisfying
π∗(x) ∈ argmax
π∈[0,1]
{
x(µ− r)πJ0x +
1
2
x2π2σ2J0xx + λ01J
1(g(π), (1 − πL)x)
}
,
c0,∗(x) ∈ argmax
c≥0
{−cJ0x + u(c)}, c1,∗(π, x) ∈ argmax
c≥0
{−cJ1x + πc/xJ1π + u(c)},
such that the strategy (π, c) is admissible, then J0(x) = V 0(x) and J1(π, x) = V 1(π, x) and
π∗, c0,∗, c1,∗ are optimal strategies.
2.3. Asymptotics for Small λ01. For the asymptotic case λ01 → 0, we may uncouple the two
value functions above. Indeed, on finite horizon when λ01 is sufficiently small, the probability of
more than one 0→ 1 transition of (Mt) is negligible. In fact, the probability of n such transitions
is approximately (using λ01 ≪ λ10) O(e−nλ01) = o(e−λ01) for n > 1. Thus, assuming that M0 = 0,
we need to consider at most two liquidity regime-changes in (Mt). For this purpose we will define
the value functions V and W as follows: V (x) represents the maximum value an agent can extract
when M0 = 0 and no liquidity shock has occurred so far; W (π, x) represents the maximum value
when M0 = 1 so the liquidity shock is already present and after its conclusion we revert to the
classical Merton setting (with value function Vˆ (x)).
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Lemma 1. We have V 0(x) = Vˆ (x) + λ01V (x) +O(λ201) where

sup
π∈[0,1],c≥0
{
−ρV + (x(r + (µ− r)π)− c)Vx + 1
2
x2π2σ2Vxx
+ λ01(W (
π(1 − L)
1− πL , (1− πL)x)− Vˆ (x)) + u(c)
}
= 0;
sup
c≥0
{
−ρW + (x(r + (α− r)π)− c)Wx + π(1− π)(α− r)Wπ + πc/xWπ
+ λ10(Vˆ (x)−W (π, x)) + u(c)
}
= 0.
(7)
Proof. Consider the formal asymptotic expansions V 0(x) = V 00(x)+λ01V
01(x)+λ201V
02(x)+O(λ301)
and V 1(π, x) = V 10(π, x) + λ01V
11(π, x) + λ201V
12(π, x) +O(λ301). Plugging into (6) and matching
powers of λ01 shows that V
0(x) = Vˆ (x) is the solution of the classical Merton problem, while
V 10(π, x) ≡ W (π, x) solves the second equation in (7). Matching terms of O(λ01) in the equation
for V 0 shows that V 01(x) ≡ V (x) solves the first equation in (7). 
3. Log Utility
We now specialize to the case u(x) = log x. We first recall the following classical result (see
(Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, Chapter 4)).
Proposition 2 (Example 9.24, p. 150 in Karatzas and Shreve (1998)). The solution of the optimal
consumption problem with log-utility is given by Vˆ (x) = 1ρ log x+ hˆ with
hˆ =
r/ρ− 1 + log ρ
ρ
+
θ2
2ρ2
, θ ,
(µ − r)
σ
.(8)
Moreover, the optimal consumption/investment strategies are given by cˆ = ρx, πˆ = µ−r
σ2
= θσ .
In the special case α = r, meaning that the excess return of the stock is zero in the illiquid
regime, an explicit solution to (6) is possible.
Theorem 1. The solution of (6) for u(x) = log x and α = r is given by V 1(π, x) = 1ρ log x+ h(π)
and V 0(x) = 1ρ log x+ b where
(9) h(π) =
r/ρ− 1 + log ρ+ λ10b+ log
(
1− π(1+λ10/ρ))
ρ+ λ10
,
and
(10) b =
r/ρ− 1 + log ρ
ρ
+ ζ(π∗) · ρ+ λ10
ρ(ρ+ λ01 + λ10)
,
ζ(π∗) , sup
π∈[0,1]
{
(µ− r)π − π2σ2/2
ρ
+
λ01
ρ+ λ10
log
(
1− g(π)(1+λ10/ρ)
)
+
λ01
ρ
log(1− πL)
}
.(11)
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The optimal investment strategy in the liquid regime is the maximizer π∗ in (11) and the optimal
consumption schedules are
c1,∗(π, x) = ρx · (1− π(1+λ10/ρ));(12)
c0,∗(x) = ρx.(13)
Theorem 1 presents a complete solution of the two-state liquidity model for log-utility. The
two asymptotic regimes will be studied in the next subsection; in the meantime let us make a brief
remark about (12)-(13). First, observe that optimal consumption in the liquid regime c0,∗ is myopic
in the sense of being unaffected by liquidity shocks. In the illiquid regime, c1,∗(·, x) ≤ c0,∗(x) is
reduced due to the cash crunch. This curtailment of consumption increases as πt ↑ 1 and the agent
becomes more liquidity-constrained. The effect decreases as the duration of liquidity shocks shrinks
(λ10 ↑) or intertemporal discounting decreases (ρ ↓).
Theorem 1 also explains the behavior of stock investments in our model. When Mt = 0, the
agent maintains a constant fraction of her wealth in stock, π∗ given in (11). When a liquidity shock
occurs at date τ , the illiquid fraction jumps to πτ = g(π
∗) and then starts growing according to
πt = Π(t− τ) where Π is the solution of the deterministic differential equation dΠ(t) = ρΠ(t)(1 −
Π(t)1+λ10/ρ) dt, Π(0) = g(π∗) resulting from combining (4) and (12). Once the liquidity shock
expires, wealth is immediately rebalanced to πt = π
∗ again.
Proof. Comparing with the form of the Merton value function in Proposition 2, we make the ansatz
given in the statement of the Theorem, V 1(π, x) = 1ρ log x+ h(π) and V
0(x) = 1ρ log x+ b.
Plugging-in into (6) we find that h must solve the nonlinear first order ode
−(ρ+ λ10)h+ r/ρ− 1 + λ10b− log(ρ−1 − πh′(π)) = 0(14)
with b the constant in V 0 and corresponding optimal consumption level of
c1,∗(π, x) =
x
ρ−1 − πh′(π) .
Taking π = 0 removes the differential term and we find
h(0) =
r/ρ− 1 + log ρ+ λ10b
ρ+ λ10
.(15)
However, since zero is a singular point for (14) with h′(0) = 0, the value of h(0) is not sufficient to
specify uniquely the solution of (14). Indeed, the general solution of (14) is
(16) h(π) = h(0) +
1
ρ+ λ10
log
(
1− Cπ(1+λ10/ρ)
)
,
with integration constant 0 < C < 1. To find C, we invoke the cash-crunch constraint which implies
limπ↑1 V
1(π, x) = −∞ or limπ↑1 h(π) = limπ↑1 h′(π) = −∞. Subject to this restriction we obtain
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C = 1 in (16) which combined with the expression for h(0) in (15) yields (9). Furthermore, (9)
leads to
h′(π) =
−π(λ10/ρ)
ρ(1− π(1+λ10/ρ))
and together with the first-order-condition for c1,∗ implies (12).
Returning to the liquid regime and substituting the ansatz of V 0(x) we obtain that b must solve
−(ρ+ λ01)b+ (r/ρ− 1 + log ρ) + λ01h(0) + ζ(π∗) = 0,
with ζ(·) defined in (11). We note that ζ(π∗) is independent of b; on the other hand recall that
h(0) in (15) is a function of b. Simplifying we end up with (10).
Since ζ(π) contains all the terms involving π, its maximizer π∗ must be the optimal investment
strategy. When λ01 = 0, the maximizer is πˆ from (8). Consequently, because h
′(π) < 0 for all π,
the optimal investment fraction π∗ < πˆ is less than the classical Merton fraction in Proposition 2.
Finally, the ansatz for V 0 implies immediately that c0,∗ = (V 0x )
−1 = ρx which matches the
consumption schedule of Proposition 2. 
When α 6= r, the ode (14) has another h′(π) term and is no longer separable. As a result, no
closed-form solution is possible; however the rest of the conclusions of Theorem 1 continue to hold,
e.g. (10), (13). The condition α = r can be interpreted as zero excess return for the stock in the
illiquid regime. By adjusting the value of L, the negative jump at the beginning of a liquidity
shock, the general α 6= r setup can be effectively approximated.
To interpret Theorem 1, we compare the liquid value function V 0(x) and the classical Merton
solution Vˆ (x) in terms of the efficiency loss Θ introduced by Rogers (2001). Namely, let 0 ≤ Θ < 1
be the percentage of total wealth that needs to be subtracted from an agent facing the classical
Merton problem to make her utility equal to that of the agent facing liquidity shocks. Then for
log-utility, Θ ≡ Θ(log) satisfies
1
ρ
log x+ b =
1
ρ
log
(
(1−Θ(log))x
)
+ hˆ ⇐⇒ Θ(log) = 1− exp(ρ(b− hˆ)).
Simplifying the above expression using (10) we find
(17) Θ(log) = 1− exp
(−θ2
2ρ
+ ζ(π∗)
ρ+ λ10
ρ+ λ01 + λ10
)
.
Thus, the loss in utility depends on the function ζ(·) in (11), as well as on the squared Sharpe ratio
θ2 of the stock.
3.1. Small λ01 Asymptotics. We recall that π
∗ satisfies the first order condition from (11),
(µ− r)− σ2π∗ + λ01
[
ρh′(g(π∗))g′(π∗)− L
1− π∗L
]
= 0.
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When πˆ < 1, we may expand around πˆ to obtain an asymptotic expression of the optimal
investment fraction π∗ for λ01 small:
π∗ = πˆ − λ01π1 +Ø(λ201) where
π1 ,
1
σ2
(
L
1− πˆL − ρh
′(g(πˆ))g′(πˆ)
)
=
1
σ2
(
L
1− πˆL +
1− L
(1− πˆL)2 ·
g(πˆ)λ10/ρ
1− g(πˆ)(1+λ10/ρ)
)
.(18)
In a typical market ρ≪ λ10 and therefore g(πˆ)λ10/ρ is negligible; it follows that the effect of liquidity
shocks on stock investment mainly depends on L.
To understand the small λ01-asymptotics of the value functions we use (7). This implies that to
leading order, we should replace b with hˆ in the expression of h(π) in (15) and therefore b satisfies
−ρb+ (r/ρ− 1 + log ρ) + λ01h(0) + ζ(π∗)− λ01hˆ+Ø(λ201) = 0.
Plugging-in the expansion of π∗ in (18) and simplifying leads to b = hˆ+ λ01b1 +Ø(λ
2
01) where
b1 =
1
ρ
[r/ρ− 1 + log ρ+ λ10hˆ
ρ+ λ10
− hˆ+ 1
ρ
log(1− πˆL) + 1
ρ+ λ10
log(1− g(πˆ)1+λ10/ρ)
]
.
When ρ≪ λ10, the above implies that the asymptotic efficiency loss is
Θ = λ01Θ1 +Ø(λ
2
01) with Θ1 ≃
θ2
2λ10
− log(1− πˆL)
ρ
.(19)
Thus, the asymptotic efficiency loss Θ1 increases quadratically in the squared Sharpe ratio of the
stock and has a logarithmic relationship with respect to stock jumps during liquidity shocks.
3.2. Assets with Large Sharpe Ratios. The above expansion is valid if πˆ < 1, i.e. the Sharpe
ratio of the risky asset is not too large. If πˆ ≥ 1, then the constraint π∗ < 1 remains in force
throughout and it is the case that limλ01→0 π
∗ = 1. Supposing that g(π∗) = 1 − ǫ for some small
parameter ǫ and using 1− (1− ǫ)a ≃ aǫ for any a > 0 the first order condition for π∗ reduces to
µ− r − σ2 − λ01
(1 + λ10/ρ)ǫ(1 − L) − λ01
L
1− L +Ø(λ01) = 0.
Therefore, 1− π∗ is asymptotically proportional to λ01 and
1− π∗ = λ01 ρ
((µ− r)− σ2)(ρ+ λ10) + Ø(λ
2
01).(20)
Using this expansion inside V 0(x) we find
V 0(x) =
[
1
ρ
log x+
r/ρ− 1 + log ρ
ρ
+
µ− r − σ2/2
ρ2
]
+
{ 1
ρ(ρ+ λ10)
λ01 log λ01
}
+Ø(λ01),(21)
where the term in the square brackets corresponds to the value of a Merton strategy with π ≡ 1.
Note that the leading term in the expansion is now of order λ01 log(λ01) due to the cash crunch.
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4. HARA Utility of Consumption
We next consider the case of HARA power utilities, u(x) = x
γ
γ , where γ ∈ (−∞, 1) \ {0} is the
risk-aversion coefficient. We start with qualitative analysis of the nonlinear ode satisfied by the
value function in the illiquid regime and then derive the small λ01 asymptotics for the liquid-regime
solution. The remaining subsections deal with special values of γ, whereby closed-form solutions
are possible for W (π, x). Throughout this section we make the standing assumption that asset
value during the liquidity shocks grows at the riskless rate α = r.
Proposition 3 (Example 9.22, p. 149 in Karatzas and Shreve (1998)). Let u(x) = xγ/γ, γ ∈
(−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1). Define
δ , ρ− γr − θ
2γ
2(1− γ) .
If γ > 0 and δ < 0 then Vˆ (x) = +∞ and infinite utility of consumption can be extracted. Otherwise,
the Merton optimal investment/consumption problem has the solution
Vˆ (x) = fˆ · x
γ
γ
, where fˆ ,
(
1− γ
δ
)1−γ
.(22)
The optimal strategies are
πˆ =
1
1− γ
(µ− r)
σ2
, cˆ(x) =
δ
1− γ x.(23)
Below we will work with the power-type utility functions that admit a convenient scaling property
in wealth. Namely, in analogue to the form of the classical Merton solution, we have
Lemma 2. For γ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1), the value functions V i are homothetic of degree γ in x.
Proof. This standard result follows from the linearity of the wealth dynamics (3) which imply that
if (cxt ) is an admissible consumption schedule for the problem with initial endowment x, then (βc
x
t )
is admissible for initial endowment of βx, β > 0. Moreover, the admissibility set A of trading
strategies is independent of the endowment. Suppose now that (cx,∗t ) is an ǫ-optimal consumption
control for V 0(x). Then using above,
V 0(βx) ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(βcx,∗s )
γ ds
]
≥ βγV 0(x)− ǫ.
Applying the same inequality with (cβx,∗t ) gives that V
0(x) ≥ β−γV 0(γx)−ǫ and since ǫ is arbitrary,
we must have V 0(βx) = βγV 0(x). Similar arguments work for V 1(π, x). 
We first concentrate on the case of small λ01 and work with the uncoupled equations (7). Based
on Lemma 2, we make the guess W (π, x) = f(π)xγ/γ. Simplifying shows that f solves
(−ρ+ γr)f + (1− γ)[f − πγ−1f ′] γγ−1 + λ10[fˆ − f ] = 0.(24)
ILLIQUIDITY EFFECTS IN OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION-INVESTMENT PROBLEMS 13
The boundary conditions for (24) will be discussed shortly. For π = 0, we can directly find f(0) as
the solution of f(0) = H−1(0) where
H(x) , (−ρ+ γr − λ10)x+ (1− γ)x
γ
γ−1 + λ10fˆ .(25)
Making the substitution e−z = π, φ(z) , (ρ− γr + λ10)f(e−z)− λ10fˆ we transform (24) into
(26)
1
γ
φ′(z) = (ρ− γr + λ10)
(
φ(z)
1− γ
)1−1/γ
−φ(z)− λ10fˆ , z ≥ 0.
The last equation is a nonlinear separable first-order ode on R+ with the right-hand-side resembling
the Bernoulli ode except for the constant term λ10fˆ . Its special form allows for much tractability.
Consider first the case γ < 0. It can then be checked that H(x) in (25) is increasing on [fˆ ,∞)
and H(fˆ) < 0 so that (25) has a unique root with f(0) > fˆ . Transferring into (26) we obtain
lim
z→∞
φ(z) = (ρ− γr + λ10)f(0)− λ10fˆ = (1− γ)f(0)
γ
γ−1 ,
and the ode (26) has a horizontal asymptote. As for log-utility, the cash constraint implies that
V 1(1, x) = −∞ which means that f(1) = φ(0) = +∞. Moreover, we have φ′(0) = −∞ and φ(z) is
monotone decreasing on [0,∞).
Next, consider γ > 0. When hyperbolic risk aversion is positive we have u(0) = 0, and the agent
can tolerate zero consumption. Therefore, V 1(1, x) and W (1, x) are finite. Taking c = 0 directly
in the pde (7) for W (π, x) and making the ansatz W (1, x) = f+(1)x
γ
γ we obtain
f+(1) =
λ10fˆ
ρ− γr + λ10 < fˆ < f(0).
Recall that ρ−γr > 0 is a necessary condition to guarantee finite fˆ and holds thanks to assumptions
of Proposition 1. Note that since the marginal utility of consumption at zero is infinite u′(c)
∣∣
c=0
=
+∞, we still have φ′(0) = f ′(1) = +∞. Conversely, the function H(·) in (25) is now decreasing and
has a unique root f(0) > fˆ . To summarize, when γ > 0, φ(·) is finite, with the singular boundary
condition φ(0) = 0, φ′(0) = +∞, and is monotonically increasing on [0,∞) to the horizontal
asymptote (1− γ)f(0) γγ−1 .
The following technical lemma, proved in the Appendix, clarifies the structure of (26).
Lemma 3. The ordinary differential equation (26) has a unique solution satisfying the above bound-
ary conditions. Moreover, for γ < 0 we have that φ(z) (resp. f(π)) is of polynomial growth as z ↓ 0
(resp. π → 1).
Recall that the optimal consumption level is given in terms of φ as
c1,∗(π, x) =
(
φ(− log(π))
1− γ
)1/γ
· x.
By Lemma 3 the consumption level c1,∗(π) is therefore polynomial in (1− π). Let π1,∗t , with initial
condition π1,∗0 = π
0,∗, be the illiquid fraction of wealth of stocks when consuming according to
c1,∗ and remaining in the illiquid regime for t time units. Then dπ1,∗t = π
1,∗
t c
1,∗(π1,∗t ,Xt)/Xt dt ≤
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(1− πt)C1 dt for some C1. It follows that there exists a constant C2, such that π1,∗t ≤ 1− t−C2 and
the cash crunch is approached at a polynomial speed.
To summarize, solutions of (24) can be written in terms of indefinite integrals. In particular,
when −γ−1 is a positive integer (i.e. γ = −1,−1/2,−1/3), the ode in (26) is of the type known as
Chini differential equation (Kamke, 1944) and may be solvable analytically. Below, we will explore
further the cases γ = −1 (leading to a quadratic ode of hyperbolic type), γ = −1/2 (leading to a
variant of the Abel cubic ode) and γ = 0.5 (leading to a reciprocal ode again of hyperbolic type).
Returning to the liquid regime, let us denote ξ(π) , f
(
π(1−L)
1−πL
)
· (1−πL)γ . We make the ansatz
V (x) = x
γ
γ · b which leads to the following algebraic equation for the constant b:
−ρ+ γr − λ01
γ
b+
1− γ
γ
b
γ
γ−1 + sup
π∈[0,1]
{
(µ− r)πb+ γ − 1
2
σ2π2b+ λ01
ξ(π)
γ
}
= 0.(27)
4.1. Small λ01 Asymptotics. Expanding b and π
∗ simultaneously in powers of λ01 as
b = fˆ + λ01b1 +Ø(λ
2
01) and π
∗ = πˆ + λ01π1 +Ø(λ
2
01),
we find that for λ01 small the first-order correction to π
∗ can be written as
π1 = −(µ− r)b1 − ξ
′(πˆ)
γ(1− γ)σ2fˆ
+Ø(λ201).(28)
Plugging back into (27), and simplifying we find
−δ(fˆ + λ01b1) + (1− γ)(fˆ + λ01b1)
γ
γ−1 + λ01(ξ(πˆ)− fˆ − λ01b1) + Ø(λ201) = 0,
so that
b1 =
ξ(πˆ)− fˆ
δ + γfˆ
1
γ−1
=
(ξ(πˆ)− fˆ)(1 − γ)
δ
.(29)
The derived formula (29) has several implications. First, translating in terms of efficiency loss
we have Θ(γ) = λ01Θ
(γ)
1 +Ø(λ
2
01) where
Θ
(γ)
1 =
1
λ01

1−
(
fˆ
fˆ + λ01b1
)1/γ = − b1
γfˆ
=
(
ξ(πˆ)
fˆ
− 1
)
(γ − 1)
γδ
.(30)
Again, unless πˆ is large (e.g. bigger than 70%), ξ(πˆ)/fˆ is close to 1 and the correction due to
illiquidity is small. Also, the consumption during the liquid regime is driven by the same expressions,
c0,∗(x) = x ·
(
fˆ + λ01b1
)1/(γ−1)
= cˆ(x)
(
1 + λ01
b1
fˆ
)1/(γ−1)
.
Equation (30) shows that the liquidity efficiency loss is driven by the key function f(π) from (24).
In the remainder of this section we investigate special values of γ whereby closed-form expressions
for f(π) (or φ(z)) are possible.
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Remark 3. The coupled equations (6) can be treated similarly, by making the ansatz V 0(x) = b¯xγ/γ
and V 1(π, x) = f¯(π)xγ/γ. This leads to the coupled equations for f¯(π) and b¯, analogously to (24)
and (27).
4.2. Hyperbolic Utility. For the case of hyperbolic utility, γ = −1, the nonlinear ode for the
illiquid regime (24) can be solved analytically.
Theorem 2. Let β , (ρ + r + λ10). The solution of (6) with u(x) = − 1x is V 0(x) = −B/x,
V 1(π, x) = −F (π)/x where
F (π) =
1
β2
{
1 + η(−1)2 + 2η(−1) · 1 + π
η(−1)
1− πη(−1)
}
,(31)
(ρ+ r + λ01)B − 2
√
B + sup
π∈[0,1]
{
(µ − r)πB − σ2π2B − λ01
1− πLF (g(π))
}
= 0,(32)
and η(−1) =
√
1 + βλ10B.
The optimal consumption schedules are c0,∗ = x/B2 and
c1,∗(π, x) = x
β(1− πη(−1))√
(1 + πη(−1))[(1 + η(−1))2 + πη(−1)(1− η(−1))2]
.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows straightforwardly by checking that the solution F (π) satisfies
the corresponding version of (24) and then substituting back into the liquid regime equation (27).
The algebraic equation (32) can be solved easily numerically for B. For small λ01 the solution of
the uncoupled HJB equation (7) is obtained by using η(−1) = (1 + βλ10fˆ)1/2 in (31) and keeping
(32) as is.
Remark 4. In the case of the large Sharpe ratio πˆ > 1 we can use (31) to re-compute the small
λ01-asymptotics. Omitting the details that are very similar to the derivations of (20)-(21) we find
π∗ = 1−
√
λ01π1 + o(λ01), π1 = 2β
−1
{
fˆ(µ− r − 2σ2)
}−1/2
.
Note that the correction terms for both π∗ and b are now of order
√
λ01.
4.3. Square-Root Utility. Another closed-form solution for W (π, x) is possible when γ = 0.5
and u(x) = 2
√
x. This case is instructive for showing the interaction of positive risk-aversion with
the liquidity freezes.
With γ = 0.5, the ode (26) can be re-written in the integral form as∫
dz + C =
∫ −2φ
φ2 + λ10fˆφ− ρ−0.5r+λ102
dφ, φ(0) = 0.
The integral on the right hand side can be computed using partial fraction decomposition. The
resulting implicit solution is
ez =
(
1 +
2φ(z)
η(0.5) + λ10fˆ
)−1−(λ10 fˆ)/η(0.5) · (1− 2φ(z)
η(0.5) − λ10fˆ
)−1+(λ10 fˆ)/η(0.5)
(33)
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where η(0.5) ,
√
2(ρ− 0.5r + λ10) + (λ10fˆ)2. We remark that for typical parameter values,
limz→∞ φ(z) is small, so that φ(z) (and hence f(π)) is very flat and consumption is not very
sensitive to π.
4.4. Connection with Abel Cubic Ode. When γ = −1/2, the function in the RHS of (26) is a
cubic polynomial with polynomial discriminant D = 227 (ρ+0.5r+λ10)− 427 (ρ+0.5r+λ10)2(λ10fˆ)2.
In a typical market we have D < 0 and thus this cubic equation has one real root (namely, h1)
and two complex conjugate roots (namely, h2 and h¯2). These roots can be obtained from the cubic
formula. Let p = ℜ(h2) and q = ℑ(h2) > 0 denote the real and imaginary parts of the complex
root h2. Then
h1 =
η(−0.5)
(ρ+ 0.5r + λ10)
+
9
8η(−0.5) , p = −
1
2
h1, q =
√
3
2
(
h1 − 9
4η(−0.5)
)
where
η(−0.5) , 3
4
(ρ+ 0.5r + λ10)
2/3
(
4λ10fˆ +
√
(4λ10fˆ)2 − 8
(ρ+ 0.5r + λ10)
)1/3
.
Since (26) is a separable ode, it can be again solved explicitly using the above roots and partial
fraction decomposition. Furthermore, since the two complex roots are conjugate, we find the real-
valued solution to the Abel ode. To conclude, the implicit solution to the ode (26) for γ = −0.5 is
given by
(34) log
{
|φ(z) − h1|√
(φ(z) − p)2 + q2
}
+
h1 − p
q
arctan
(
q
φ(z)− p
)
= − 4
27
((h1 − p)2 + q2)(ρ+ 0.5r + λ10)z.
Remark 5. For the case of γ = −1/3, the degree of the polynomial ode (26) is four. The roots of
a polynomial up to degree 4 can be explicitly found in terms of its coefficients. Using the quartic
formula, the polynomial ode (26) of degree 4 can then also be explicitly solved.
5. Numerical Examples
To illustrate our derivations above we present a series of numerical examples. Recall that the
model for γ = 0 admits closed-form solutions given in Theorem 1 and for γ = −1 in (31)-(32).
These formulas are explicit up to finding the maximizer π∗ of the liquid regime that can be easily
obtained through a standard numerical optimization algorithm. Formulas (33) and (34) give im-
plicit solutions for W (π, x) for γ = +0.5 and γ = −0.5 respectively. Inverting these expressions
numerically and plugging them into (27) one can again straightforwardly solve the model. Finally,
for general γ one can use numerical integration routine on (56) and combine it with a root-finding
algorithm for (27) to compute V (x) and W (π, x). The coupled system (6) can be solved similarly
by employing a Picard iteration over successive numerical approximations to V 0(x) and V 1(π, x).
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The key parameter in our model is the coefficient of risk-aversion γ. To illustrate its effect
we focus on the three cases of γ ∈ {0, 0.5,−1} which correspond to log-utility, square-root and
hyperbolic risk-aversion coefficients. As discussed above, if πˆ is moderate (less than 60 − 70%),
the effect of liquidity freezes is typically negligible; therefore the interesting situation is where πˆ is
close to 1. Since πˆ depends on γ (cf. (23)), to compare different HARA utilities we fix πˆ and then
adjust the excess return µ− r as γ varies. In other words we take µ = r + πˆσ2(1− γ).
Our base parameter set is ρ = r = 0.05, σ = 0.167, α = 0.05, L = 0, λ01 = 0.1, λ10 = 2. The
stock drift is µ = 0.05 + 0.025(1 − γ), equivalent to πˆ = 0.9, which is rather large and makes the
effect of illiquidity noticeable. This base case is supposed to represent a realistic stock market that
experiences a major liquidity crisis about every ten years (e.g. historically in 1987, 1998, 2008, etc.);
once started, the crisis lasts for about six months. To study the effect of liquidity shock parameters,
we also vary the λ’s and L.
To study our asymptotic approximations for small λ01, in Table 1 we compare the solution using
the coupled system (6) to the approximate formulas (18) (γ = 0 case) and (29) (γ 6= 0 case). The
last two columns also compare the efficiency loss (relative to the classical Merton optimizer with
λ01 = 0) using the exact solution and the small-λ01 approximation. As expected, when λ01 ↓ 0,
the optimal investment proportion π∗ converges to the Merton solution πˆ and the quality of the
asymptotic approximations improves. Same conclusions hold for the efficiency loss.
As can be seen in Table 1, for realistic parameter values and L = 0, the efficiency loss is mild
(less than 2% for logarithmic and hyperbolic utilities and less than 1% for square-root utility).
This conclusion is consistent with the “relaxed investor” property of the Merton problem found by
Rogers (2001); Rogers and Zane (2002) who studied efficiency loss when trading is discretized on
a time grid. Thus, inability to rebalance continuously is not crucial, while cash crunch constraints
will also be weak unless λ10 is small.
Not surprisingly, if liquidity shocks are accompanied by significant price decreases, a major utility
loss is experienced since the excess return of the asset is effectively cut. Even if a liquidity shock
occurs once every 10 years and causes a relatively minor negative jump of L = 10% in asset price,
the optimal investment fraction π∗ in the risky asset is reduced from 90% to 52% for log-utility and
69% for hyperbolic utility (the square-root investor is barely affected and down-weighs to 88.8%).
In general, the derived asymptotic expressions underestimate the adjustment in risky investments
π∗ < πˆ + λ01π1 and overestimate the efficiency loss Θ < λ01Θ1. This is intuitive given the
convexity/concavity of the respective quantities and the linear approximations taken. Note that
comparison of given quantities for different utilities is rather difficult, although we can claim that
the square-root optimizer is highly insensitive to liquidity and the hyperbolic optimizer is somewhat
more sensitive than the log-utility agent. Overall, Table 1 seems to indicate that while the risk of
negative asset jumps is crucial, the risk of illiquidity per se is not a significant driver of optimal
investment decisions.
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Log Utility u(x) = log(x), µ = 0.075
Case π∗ πˆ + λ01π1 Θ λ01Θ1
Base 0.879 0.846 1.08 1.15
w/ λ01 = 0.05 0.886 0.873 0.56 0.58
w/ λ01 = 0.02 0.893 0.889 0.23 0.23
w/ λ10 = 4 0.900 0.899 0.54 0.55
w/ L = 0.1 0.521 0.467 13.97 18.13
w/ λ01 = 0.5, λ10 = 10 0.900 0.900 1.06 1.11
Hyperbolic Utility u(x) = −x−1, µ = 0.1
Case π∗ πˆ + λ01π1 Θ λ01Θ1
Base 0.857 0.683 1.92 2.36
w/ λ01 = 0.05 0.867 0.792 1.01 1.18
w/ λ01 = 0.02 0.879 0.857 0.43 0.47
w/ λ10 = 4 0.895 0.901 0.90 0.92
w/ L = 0.1 0.691 0.652 17.16 18.55
w/ λ01 = 0.5, λ10 = 10 0.900 0.916 1.77 1.83
Square-Root Utility u(x) = 2
√
x, µ = 0.0625
Case π∗ πˆ + λ01π1 Θ λ01Θ1
Base 0.895 0.898 0.589 0.623
w/ λ01 = 0.05 0.897 0.899 0.302 0.312
w/ λ01 = 0.02 0.899 0.900 0.120 0.125
w/ λ10 = 4 0.898 0.900 0.304 0.314
w/ L = 0.1 0.888 0.335 16.737 20.213
w/ λ01 = 0.5, λ10 = 10 0.878 0.838 0.606 0.638
Table 1. Optimal investment proportions and efficiency loss for HARA utility-
maximizers with γ = 0 (log-utility), γ = −1 (hyperbolic utility) and γ = 0.5 (square-
root utility). Θ measures the percent efficiency loss compared to λ01 = 0 (Merton
problem) and Θ1 is the asymptotic efficiency loss derived in (17) and (30).
To further explore the role of investor’s risk aversion, Figure 1 compares the optimal consumption
schedules in the illiquid regime for three different levels of γ, namely γ ∈ {0.5, 0,−0.5}. While
comparison of value functions is hard due to different utility units, all consumption is proportional
to total current wealth x and moreover must decrease as the proportion of wealth in cash (1 − π)
shrinks. Recall that in the classical Merton setting, c∗/x > ρ when γ < 0 and c∗/x > ρ when γ > 0
and the proportion of wealth consumed is maximized at γ = −1.
As shown in Figure 1, c1,∗ is decreasing in γ for moderate values of π and is increasing in γ for
π close to 1. This confirms our intuition that the cash crunch is most felt by the most risk-averse
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Figure 1. Consumption schedules c1,∗ in the illiquid regime. Parameter values are
fixed at σ = 0.166, µ = 0.0625, r = ρ = 0.05 and λ10 = 1, L = 0. We compare
the square-root (γ = 0.5), logarithmic (γ = 0) and inverse square-root (γ = −0.5)
maximizers. All values are normalized by current wealth (i.e. we plot c1,∗(π, x)/x).
investors. Interestingly, around π ∼ 0.9, no obvious ordering between c1,∗(x; γ) is possible. For
π < 0.8, f ′(π) is very small all γ’s, and therefore consumption is essentially constant in π.
6. Homogenized Limit
We now consider the homogenized limit ǫ → 0 with respect to the transition matrix Qǫ = Q/ǫ
of M . This corresponds to the model where liquidity regimes change on a fast time-scale, with
λ¯ = λ10/(λ01 + λ10) proportion of time spent in the liquid unconstrained regime. Formally, we
assume that that the transition rates of M are λ10/ǫ and λ01/ǫ, the jumps are rescaled as L = ǫL¯,
and then proceed to carry out a first-order formal asymptotic expansion in the small parameter ǫ.
As ǫ→ 0, the effective duration of liquidity shocks goes to zero. Therefore, the investment propor-
tion process πt converges to a constant value, which is the optimizer of the equation defining V
0(x).
Simultaneously, this means that V 1(·, x) becomes less and less sensitive to π, limǫ→0 V 1π (π, x) = 0
for all π ∈ [0, 1) (super-polynomially), and therefore the optimization over π in (6) is simplified.
As ǫ → 0, the ergodic Markov chain M averages out the drift and volatility of S. Let us
call a cycle a pair of transitions of M from state 0 to state 1 and back to state zero. Then the
length of a cycle is about ∼ ǫ(λ−101 + λ−110 ) during which the expected mean of an S-increment is
∼ µǫλ−101 +αǫλ−110 − ǫL¯ and the quadratic variation of S over one cycle is ∼ ǫλ−101 σ2. Simplifying the
above expressions which become exact as ǫ → 0 and using the fact that the homogenized process
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remains a diffusion we obtain that the averaged asset dynamics S¯ are
dS¯t/S¯t = (α+ (µ− α− λ01L¯)λ¯) dt+ λ¯1/2σ dWt.
However, as we will see below, the optimal strategy will not converge to the Merton solution
corresponding to S¯.
6.1. Log Utility. First, consider the log-utility investor. We directly work with (6) and make the
ansatz V 0(x) = B0+ǫB1+Ø(ǫ
2)+ 1ρ log x and V
1(π, x) = B0+ǫF (π)+Ø(ǫ
2). The leading term is the
same in both equations because the dominant term in the expression for V 1 is λ10(V
0(x)−V 1(π, x)).
Collecting terms of order Ø(1) in the illiquid regime we obtain
−ρB0 + 1
ρ
(r + (α− r)π − ρ) + log ρ = λ10(F (π)−B1).
Back in the liquid regime, we find π∗hom =
θhom
2σ , where
θhom ,
1
σ
(µ − r − λ01L¯+ λ01
λ10
(α− r))
and B0 solves
B0 =
r/ρ− 1 + log ρ
ρ
+ λ¯
θ2hom
2ρ2
.(35)
Comparing with the benchmark in (8), we may interpret the limiting value function in (35) as
solution of the classical problem for a risky asset with a modified squared Sharpe ratio of λ¯θ2hom
rather than θ2 as in (8). Therefore, the homogenized loss in utility computed in (17) translates into
lim
ǫ→0
Θ , Θ
(log)
hom = 1− exp(
1
2ρ
(λ¯θ2hom − θ2)).(36)
Counter-intuitively, we find that the derivative ofΘ
(log)
hom with respect to λ01 and λ10 may be of either
sign depending on parameter values. For instance, if µ > α > r and L = 0 then ∂Θ
(log)
hom/∂λ10 > 0;
however if µ is large and α < r then ∂Θ
(log)
hom/∂λ10 < 0.
In the special case α = r, the explicit results of Proposition 1 apply and yield (35) directly.
In that case since the growth rate of the risky asset during liquidity shocks is α = r, we can
assign the illiquid regime a Sharpe ratio of zero. Then λ¯θ2hom corresponds exactly to averaging
the squared Sharpe-ratios of each liquidity regime according to the invariant distribution of M . In
contrast, the averaged price process S¯ has excess return of λ¯(µ− r − λ01L¯) and volatility of
√
λ¯σ.
Thus, the illiquidity constraint causes the agent to apply the wrong strategy over the averaged
stock process. This is particularly clear in the case L = 0 whereby limǫ→0 π
∗ = πˆ which is the
optimal strategy of the liquid regime that is employed over the homogenized price process S¯.
In the related setting of a fast-scale regime-switching stock model with M -modulated drift and
volatility (but no liquidity constraints), Ba¨uerle and Rieder (2004) showed that the log-investor
also loses Θ
(log)
hom of utility compared to the Merton model. Therefore, for the log-investor in the
homogenized limit the liquidity constraint completely disappears. When α 6= r, θhom no longer has
an averaging interpretation and the liquidity constraint remains in force even in the homogenized
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limit. For Example 1 in Section 5 above, we find Θ
(log)
hom = 1.066%, which is very close to the value
Θ = 1.061% for λ01 = 0.5, λ10 = 10 in Table 1.
6.2. HARA Utility. To obtain the homogenized limit for the HARA investor, we carry out a
similar formal asymptotic expansion of equations (24) and (27) in the small parameter ǫ. Starting
once more from the ansatz V 0(x) = (B0+ ǫB1+Ø(ǫ
2))xγ/γ and V 1(π, x) = (B0+ ǫF (π))x
γ/γ, we
obtain
λ10(F (π) −B1) = (−ρ+ γr + (α− r)π)B0 + (1− γ)B
γ
γ−1
0 ,
and the optimizer π∗ is
π∗ =
1
(1− γ)σ2
[
µ− r − λ01L¯+ λ01
λ10γ
(α− r)
]
.
Denoting θ
(γ)
hom ,
1
σ
(
µ− r − λ01L¯+ λ01λ10γ (α− r)
)
, the equation for B0 reduces to
(
(−ρ+ γr)B0 + (1− γ)B
γ
γ−1
0
)(
1 +
λ01
λ10
)
+
γ
2(1 − γ)σ
(
θ
(γ)
hom
)2
·B0 = 0,
=⇒ B0 = (1− γ)1−γ
(
ρ− γr − λ¯(θ(γ)hom)2
γ
2(1− γ)
)γ−1
.
Again, we interpret the expression for B0 as the solution of the classical Merton problem after
modifying the Sharpe ratio of the risky asset to λ¯θ
(γ)
hom. The resulting efficiency loss is
Θ
(γ)
hom = 1−

ρ− γr − λ¯
γ(θ
(γ)
hom
)2
2(1−γ)
ρ− γr − γθ22(1−γ)


(γ−1)/γ
.(37)
For Example I in Section 5 the efficiency losses for the homogenized limit are Θ
(−1)
hom = 1.742% for
Hyperbolic utility (compare with 1.766% loss for λ01 = 0.1, λ10 = 2 in Table 1) andΘ
(0.5)
hom = 0.600%
for Square-root utility (compare with 0.606% loss in last row of Table 1 for γ = 0.5). Thus, these
limiting expressions give accurate approximations even for moderate values of λ01 and λ10.
7. Logarithmic Consumption on Finite Horizon
We proceed to study a finite horizon version of the model above. With finite horizon, time
inhomogeneity introduces additional effects. In particular, close to terminal date T , both the cash
crunch and the opportunity cost of illiquidity vanish. The corresponding stochastic control problem
under consideration is now:
sup
(π,c)∈A
E
x
[∫ T
0
e−ρs log cs ds
]
.(38)
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Proposition 4. For model (38), the Merton solution is
Vˆ (t, x) , kˆ(t) log x+ hˆ(t)(39)
=
1
ρ
(1− e−ρ(T−t)) log x− 1
ρ
(1− e−ρ(T−t)) log
(
1− e−ρ(T−t)
ρ
)
+
(
(µ − r)2
2σ2ρ2
+
r − ρ
ρ2
)(
1− e−ρ(T−t)(1 + ρ(T − t))
)
The optimal consumption and investment strategies are:
cˆ =
ρx
1− e−ρ(T−t) , πˆ =
µ− r
σ2
.
Assuming that λ01 is small and with a slight abuse of notation, denote by W (t, π, x) and V (t, x)
the first-order correction terms to V 1(t, π, x) and V 0(t, π, x) as in (7). Then the finite-horizon
analogue of (7) is now

sup
c>0
{
Wt + (x(r + (α− r)π)− c)Wx + π(1− π)(α − r)Wπ + π c
x
Wπ
+ λ10(Vˆ (t, x)−W (t, π, x)) + log c− ρW
}
= 0,
sup
π∈[0,1],c>0
{
Vt + (x(r + (µ − r)π)− c)Vx + 1
2
x2π2σ2Vxx
+ λ01(W
(
t,
π(1− L)
1− πL , (1 − πL)x
)− V (t, x)) + log c− ρV } = 0,
with zero terminal conditions W (T, π, x) = V (T, x) = 0 for all π, x, and the singular boundary
condition W (t, 1, x) = −∞ for all t, x.
Theorem 3. The value functions for (38) are V (t, x) = kˆ(t) log x + h0(t) and W (t, π, x) =
kˆ(t) log x+ h1(t, π) where hi satisfy
0 = h1t − ρh1 + rkˆ(t)− 1 + λ10(hˆ(t)− h1(t, π))− log(kˆ(t)− πh1π(t, π)),(40)
h0(t) =
∫ T
t
e−(ρ+λ01)(s−t)[rkˆ(s)− 1− log kˆ(s) + ξ(s)] ds,(41)
with terminal conditions h0(T ) = 0, h1(π, T ) = 0 and
(42) ξ(t) , sup
π∈[0,1]
{
(µ− r)πkˆ(t)− 1
2
σ2π2kˆ(t) + λ01 ·
[
kˆ(t) log(1− πL) + h1(t, π(1− L)
(1− πL)
)]}
.
The small λ01-asymptotics are
(43)


π∗ = πˆ +
λ01
σ2
[
−L
1− πˆL +
1
kˆ(t)
h1π(t, g(πˆ))g
′(πˆ)
]
,
h0(t) = hˆ(t) + λ01
[∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)(h1(s, g(πˆ))− hˆ(s)) ds
+ log(1− πˆL)
(
1− e−ρ(T−t)(1 + ρ(T − t))
ρ2
)]
.
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Let us note that the key equation (40) is a first-order nonlinear pde on [0, T ] × [0, 1]. Because
of the cash-crunch, it has the degenerate boundary condition limπ→1 h
1(t, π) = −∞ which makes
its numerical solution nontrivial. To overcome this difficulty, in Section 7.1 below we carry out an
asymptotic expansion of h1(t, ·) around π = 1.
The small λ01-asymptotics of the optimal investment fraction show that the effect of liquidity
shocks mainly depends on stock jumps since h1π is negligible for typical market parameter values
and large time horizon. The correction term in the small λ01-asymptotics of the value function h
0,
however, depends on stock jumps as well as efficiency loss during liquidity shocks. This correction
term is always negative and decreases in magnitude as t→ T .
7.1. Cash Crunch on Finite Horizon. When the market is illiquid and π ≃ 1, the agent
experiences a cash crunch. The resulting singular boundary condition V 1(t, 1, x) = −∞ presents a
numerical challenge for solving (40). To resolve this issue, we carry out an asymptotic analysis of
the optimal behavior when (1− π) is small.
Lemma 4. Let h1(t, π) be given in (40). Then asymptotically for small 1− π and any 0 < d < 1
h1(t, 1− dπ) = h1(t, 1− π) + 1− e
−(ρ+λ10)(T−t)
ρ+ λ10
log d+ o(1− π).(44)
Proof. When most of the wealth is in the stock and Mt = 1, consumption is driven by the amount
of cash available, y = (1 − π)x. Indeed, because the agent must maintain positive consumption,
she concentrates on avoiding a complete cash depletion. Let τ ∼ Exp(λ10) be the next jump-time
of M . Then the agent solves the optimization sub-problem
W (t, 1− π, x) = C(y;x) , sup
(ct)
E
[∫ τ∧(T−t)
0
e−ρs log cs ds + e
−ρ(τ∧(T−t))V 0(τ,Xxτ + Y
y
τ )
]
,
where (Yt) is the amount of cash at date t obeying dYt = (rYt− ct) dt, and Xt is the wealth in stock
obeying Xt = xe
rt. Since (1 − π) is small, Xτ ≫ Yτ and therefore consumption is asymptotically
linear in remaining cash, since cs effectively only appears in the log cs-term. Therefore, for any
fraction d < 1,
C(d · y;x) ≃
∫ T−t
0
e−ρs log(d · c∗s)e−λ10s + λ10e−(ρ+λ10)sV 0(s, xers) ds
= C(y;x) +
∫ T−t
0
{e−(ρ+λ10)s log d} ds
= C(y;x) +
1− e−(ρ+λ10)(T−t)
ρ+ λ10
log d.
Re-arranging the last expression in terms of h1 we obtain (44). 
24 M. LUDKOVSKI AND H. MIN
0
0.5
1 0
1
2
3
40
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Time to horizon T − tpi
R
el
at
iv
e
P
er
ce
n
t
U
ti
li
ty
Figure 2. Relative utility of W (t, π, x) with respect to Vˆ (t, x) for different propor-
tions of cash holdings 1− π. On the vertical axis we plot the percent efficiency loss
Θ = 1− exp
(
h1(t,π)−hˆ(t)
kˆ(t)
)
. Here T = 2, r = ρ = 0.05, µ = 0.075, σ = 1/6 and L = 0.
We may use (44) as a numerical boundary condition to solve (40). Namely, we construct a finite
grid {0,∆π, 2∆π, . . . , 1−∆π} and solve (40) using a finite-difference scheme, applying
h1(t, 1 −∆π) = h1(t, 1− 2∆π)− 1− e
−(ρ+λ10)(T−t)
ρ+ λ10
log 2,
which is now a finite boundary condition at π = 1−∆π. Such a numerical solution is presented in
Figure 2 which compares the resulting h1(t, π) to the Merton solution hˆ(t). As t→ 0, the percent
efficiency loss is linear in π (becoming proportional in available cash); as t→∞, the efficiency loss
converges to the infinite-horizon formula (17).
7.2. Terminal Utility without Consumption. A related model recently appeared in Diesinger et al.
(2010), DKS hereafter. The latter paper was one of the inspirations for our analysis and considered
optimization of terminal wealth under liquidity shocks. In contrast to our analysis, DKS did not
allow for consumption but did allow a more general form of multiple liquidity shocks (rather than
a two-state Markov chain). Similar to our results, DKS obtained explicit solutions for the case of
log-utility. In this section we carry out the asymptotic analysis of their model which provides an
instructive counterpart to our optimal consumption problem.
The DKS objective is
sup
π∈A
E
t,x
[
log(XT (1− 1{MT=1}πTL))
]
.(45)
Thus, if the market is illiquid at terminal date T , total wealth is reduced by L%.
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First, we recall that
Proposition 5. The Merton solution for maximizing terminal wealth is
sup
π∈A0
E
t,x[log(XT )] = log x+ (r +
(µ − r)2
2σ2
)(T − t), π∗ = (µ− r)
σ2
.(46)
Denote by J0(t, x), J1(t, π, x) the value functions corresponding to (45). Then J i solve the system

J0t + sup
π∈[0,1]
{
x(r + (µ − r)π)J0x +
1
2
x2π2σ2J0xx + λ01(J
1(t, x, π) − J0(t, x))
}
= 0,
J1t + x(r + (α− r)π)J1x + λ10(J0(t, x)− J1(t, π, x)) + π(1− π)(α− r)J1,kπ = 0,
J0(T, x) = log x, and J1(T, π, x) = log x(1− πL).
When α = r, the solution reads (Diesinger et al., 2010, Section 5) J0(t, x) = log x + f0(t) and
J1(t, π, x) = log x+ f1(t, π) where
f0(t) =
[(
r + (µ − r)π∗DKS −
1
2
σ2(π∗DKS)
2 +
λ01
λ10
(r + λ10 log(1− π∗DKSL))
)
1− e−(λ01+λ10)(T−t)
λ01 + λ10
(47)
− r
λ10
(e−λ10(T−t) − e−(λ01+λ10)(T−t))
]
· λ01
λ01 + λ10
+
[λ01r
λ210
(−1 + e−λ10(T−t))
+
(
r + (µ − r)π∗DKS −
1
2
σ2(π∗)2 +
λ01
λ10
(r + λ10 log(1− π∗DKSL))
)
(T − t)
]
· λ10
λ01 + λ10
f1(t, π) =
∫ T
t
(λ10f
0(s) + (r + λ10 log(1− πL)))e−λ10(s−t) ds+ log(1− πL)e−λ10(T−t),
with optimal investment proportion π∗DKS defined through
0 = (µ − r)− σ2π∗DKS − λ01
L
1− Lπ∗DKS
.(48)
We proceed to understand the asymptotics of the above expressions when λ01 is small. First,
expanding (48) in λ01 we find (subject to the condition 1 > (µ− r)/σ2 > 0)
π∗DKS =
σ2 + (µ− r)L−
√
(σ2 − (µ− r)L)2 + 4σ2L2λ01
2σ2L
=
µ− r
σ2
− λ01 L
σ2 − (µ− r)L +O(λ
2
01).(49)
As expected, risk of illiquidity reduces holdings of stock, with the effect increasing as (i) σ decreases
or (ii) µ increases or (iii) the liquidity jump loss L increases. For typical parameter values the
denominator above is quite small and therefore the relative changes in π∗DKS can be quite big even
for a small change in the underlying parameter. Note that if L = 0 then the optimal strategy
is always equal to the Merton solution πˆ, due to the form of the first-order condition of π∗DKS.
This phenomenon of myopic investment is unique to log-utility. In the same vein, π∗DKS is in fact
independent of λ10 to first order.
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Comparing the expression (49) of the optimal investment proportion to a similar expression (18)
derived in Section 3 we see the impact of consumption on investment. Indeed, the two problems are
identical except that intermediate consumption introduces the cash-crunch feature which increases
the impact of illiquidity. Analytically, this difference is exactly represented by
π∗DKS − π∗ = λ01
1− L
(1− πˆL)2
g(πˆ)λ10/ρ
1− g(πˆ)λ10/ρ .
As already discussed, unless πˆ is very close to 1 or λ10 is small, this difference is relatively small
and therefore there is little difference between maximization of terminal wealth and maximization
of utility of consumption.
Plugging into the expression for f0 in (47) and simplifying we end up with
f0(t) = (r +
(µ− r)2
2σ2
)(T − t) + λ01
[(µ− r)2
2σ2λ210
·
(
1− e−λ10(T−t) − λ10(T − t)
)
+ log
(
1− (µ− r)L
σ2
)
(T − t)
]
+O(λ201).
Comparing with the limiting case λ01 = 0 in (46), we obtain that the percentage loss in utility is
Θ(DKS)(t) = λ01Θ
(DKS)
1 (t) + Ø(λ
2
01) with
Θ
(DKS)
1 (t) =
[(µ− r)2
2σ2λ210
·
(
e−λ10(T−t) + λ10(T − t)− 1
)
− log
(
1− (µ− r)L
σ2
)
(T − t)
]
.(50)
Both terms above are always positive and decrease (approximately linearly) in magnitude as t→ T .
Again, the squared Sharpe ratio makes an appearance. Counterintuitively, as λ10 → ∞, the
illiquidity correction does not vanish, even if the amount of time spent in the illiquid regime
is negligible. This is because there is always a possibility of an illiquid shock right before T ,
proportional to λ01 which would produce a loss of L% of equity.
Similar analysis can be done for the fast-scale liquidity freezes:
Lemma 5. Rescale the generator of M as Qǫ = ǫ−1Q. Then as ǫ→ 0 we have
π∗ → (µ− r − λ01L¯)
σ2
, f0(t)→ (T − t)r + λ¯(T − t)(µ − r − λ01L¯)
2
σ2
.
Therefore the homogenized percent efficiency loss is
Θ
(DKS)
hom (t) = 1− exp
(
(T − t)1
2
{λ¯θ˜2 − θ2}
)
.(51)
We omit the proof of Lemma 5 which is similar to the computations for (36) and follows from
expressions (48)-(47) after tedious arithmetic simplifications. Also note that the efficiency loss in
(51) essentially matches (36) except for the discount factor.
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8. Conclusion
In this paper we considered a perturbed version of the classical Merton optimal investment-
consumption model. Our modification accounts for possibility of liquidity shocks during which
the agent cannot trade and cannot use her stock holdings for consumption. The liquidity shocks
also lead to negative jumps in risky asset price and reduce its excess return. We obtained explicit
formulas for HARA utility-maximizers, especially for the special cases of γ = 0,±0.5,−1. The
economic interpretation of our results was carried out by deriving the percent efficiency loss relative
to the respective Merton problem solution. We showed that the asymptotic effect of illiquidity can
be captured by appropriately modifying the Sharpe ratio of the underlying asset inside the classical
formulas. This gives a simple rule to the investor in terms of accounting for liquidity shocks.
Overall, we found that for realistic parameter values, the efficiency loss is primarily driven by the
jump parameter L.
Our model can be easily extended if one is willing to sacrifice analytical tractability. Natural
extensions would allow for more complex stock dynamics (such as general jump-diffusion processes,
non-zero volatility in the illiquid regime), arbitrary utility functions, further market frictions or
multiple stocks. The resulting HJB equations would then be modified version of the respective
classical optimal investment models, see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1998). Also, other risk objectives
might be considered to judge the attitude of the investor towards illiquidity. Our first setting where
probability of a liquidity shock is small resembles the lifetime investment problem, in which case
quantities such as probability of ruin become important risk metrics. Another direction that we
leave to future work is to consider the effect of liquidity shocks on indifference pricing of contingent
claims.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof is largely standard and follows the classical Verification Theorem for stochastic
control of diffusions (Fleming and Soner, 1993, Theorem IV.5.1). To simplify the presentation, we
consider the case u(0) > −∞. In the sequel we will primarily work with HARA utilities u(x) = xγ/γ
which are infinite at the origin for γ < 0. That case can be treated similarly to the proof below by
using the resulting homothetic property of the value function (see Lemma 2 and the methods in
Shreve and Soner (1994)). Let us also mention the paper Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009) which
had a similar verification theorem for optimal consumption in a regime-switching model.
Define u˜(x) = u(x) − u(0). Then u˜ is another utility function, and E[∫∞0 e−ρtu˜(ct) dt] =
E[
∫∞
0 e
−ρtu(ct) dt] − u(0)/ρ. Moreover the admissible strategy sets are the same for the prob-
lem with u˜(·) and u(·). Therefore, without loss of generality we assume for the remainder of the
proof that u(0) = 0.
To apply the conclusions of (Fleming and Soner, 1993, Theorem IV.5.1), the following steps need
to be verified.
Step 1: Check that V i(·) <∞ are finite. Case 1: supc u(c) = +∞. In this situation of “positive
risk aversion”, it may well be the case that the value functions are infinite since even a modest level
of consumption can generate a lot of utility; see Proposition 3 below. To avoid this we assume that
the liquidity-unconstrained problem with value functions
V˜ 0(x) = sup
π,c∈A0
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(ct(X
x,π,c
t )) dt |M0 = 0
]
,
and similarly for V˜ 1(π, x), are finite. We refer to Sotomayor and Cadenillas (2009) for exhaustive
analysis of that setting. Since A ⊆ A0 we immediately obtain that under the above assumption,
V 0(x) ≤ V˜ 0(x) <∞ and V 1(π, x) ≤ V˜ 1(π, x) <∞.
Case 2: supc u(c) <∞. In that case, we immediately have V 1(π, x) ≤ V 0(x) ≤ {supc u(c)}ρ−1.
Step 2: We next show that J i(·) solving (6) are upper bounds for the value functions.
Let (π, c) be an admissible strategy. The assumptions on (π, c) then guarantee that the sde in (3)
has a unique strong solution (in fact, a closed-form representation is possible, see Sotomayor and Cadenillas
(2009)).
The basic idea is now to apply Ito’s lemma to the semi-martingale (Xx,π,ct ,Mt). Let θ , inf{t :
Xx,π,ct = 0}. Since wealth is required to stay non-negative, no consumption is possible on (θ,∞]
and it follows that V 0(0) = V 1(π, 0) = 0. Fix initial wealth x and constants 0 < a1 < x < a2 <∞
and a3 < 1. Let τ , τ1 ∧ τ2 ∧ τ3 ∧ θ, with
τ1 , inf {t : Xx,π,ct ≤ a1} , τ2 , inf {t : Xx,π,ct ≥ a2} , τ3 , inf {t : {πt ≥ a3} ∩ {Mt = 1}} .
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For any t < ∞, the quantities Xx,π,c, J0(Xx,π,cs ), J0x(Xx,π,cs ), J1(πs,Xx,π,cs ), being solutions of
(6), are local martingales. Moreover, they are bounded on [0, t ∧ τ ] and consequently are all true
martingales until t ∧ τ . Applying the optional sampling theorem we obtain
J0(x)− E
[∫ t∧τ
0
e−ρsu(cs) ds
]
≥ E
[
e−ρt∧τ (J0(Xx,π,ct∧τ )1{Mt∧τ=0} + J
1(πt∧τ ,X
x,π,c
t∧τ )1{Mt∧τ=1}
]
.
(52)
Now the right hand side in (52) is non-negative, so that J0(x) ≥ Ex[∫ t∧τ0 e−ρsu(cs) ds] and taking
a1 → 0, a2 → ∞, a3 → 1 and using Monotone Convergence Theorem (MCT), we obtain J0(x) ≥
E
x
[∫ t∧θ
0 e
−ρsu(cs) ds
]
. Finally, taking t → ∞ and again using MCT we find J0(x) ≥ V 0(x; (π, c))
as desired. Similar steps apply to J1(π, x).
Step 3: Verify existence of optimal controls. In our case sufficient first order conditions for the
consumption optimizer above imply that
c1,∗ = (u′)−1(V 1x −
π
x
V 1π ), c
0,∗ = (u′)−1(V 0x ),
Assumed smoothness of V i guarantees existence of ci,∗. The investment optimizer solves
(µ− r)xV 0x + π∗x2σ2V 0xx + V 1π (g(π∗), (1 − π∗L)x) g′(π∗)− LxV 1x (g(π∗), (1 − π∗L)x) = 0,
and an interior solution on [0, 1] is guaranteed if µ > r. Indeed, in the latter case the above
expression is positive when π = 0 and goes to −∞ as π → 1 (we have u′(0) = +∞ and as proportion
of liquid wealth shrinks, consumption must be reduced to zero, implying that limπ↑1 V
1
π = −∞).

Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The ode (26) is separable and therefore the corresponding theory may be applied (Walter,
1998, p.31). We begin by re-writing in terms of indefinite integrals as∫
dz + C =
∫
dφ
γ(ρ− γr + λ10)
(
φ
(1−γ)
)1−1/γ
− γφ− γλ10fˆ
.(53)
First consider the case γ > 0. An easy argument shows that φ(·) is increasing and therefore the
solution satisfying φ(0) = 0 is given implicitly by
z =
∫ φ(z)
0
dx
γH˜(x)
, H˜(x) =
{
(ρ− γr + λ10)
(
x
1− γ
)1−1/γ
− x− λ10fˆ
}
.(54)
Recall the horizontal asymptote limz→∞ φ(z) = (1−γ)f(0)
γ
γ−1 . Checking that H˜((1−γ)f(0) γγ−1 ) =
H(f(0)) = 0, and using H˜(x) > 0 for x < f(0) and γ > 0 we see that limz↑φ(∞)
∫ z
0
dx
γH˜(x)
= +∞
and thus the boundary conditions are matched correctly.
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When γ < 0, φ(z) is decreasing; therefore for N > φ(∞) the unique solution to (26) satisfying
φ(0) = N is given by
z = −
∫ N
φ(z)
dx
γH˜(x)
.(55)
Moreover, since the continuous function H˜ is bounded on the compact domain [φ(∞), N ], the
solution φ(·) is Lipschitz on [0,∞). Since the leading power in H˜(x) is 1− γ−1 > 1 for negative γ,
the integral in (55) is proper and converges as N → ∞. Therefore, taking the limit, we find that
the unique solution with limz→0 φ(z) = +∞ is
z =
∫ ∞
φ(z)
−dx
γH˜(x)
.(56)
Fix N ′ large enough. Then for x > N ′, γH˜(x) = γ(ρ − γr + λ10)
(
x
1−γ
)1−1/γ
+ o(x1−1/γ) and
therefore∫ ∞
N ′
−dx
γH˜(x)
≃
∫ ∞
N ′
1
A
x1/γ−1dx = − γ
A
(N ′)1/γ , A , (ρ− γr + λ10)(1− γ)γ−1−1 + o(N ′).
Comparing with (56) we find that
φ(ǫ) = ǫγ(1− γ)1−γ(ρ− γr + λ10)γ +Ø(ǫ).
Thus, φ grows polynomially (at rate γ) around zero. Finally, transforming back into the π-variable,
and using that for ǫ small enough, e−ǫ > 1− 2ǫ we obtain
f(1− ǫ) = Ø(ǫγ)
showing that f also grows polynomially as the cash crunch is approached. 
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Once again following the form of the unperturbed problem, we posit that under liquidity
shocks, the value functions are V (t, x) = k0(t) log x + h0(t), W (t, π, x) = k1(t) log x + h1(t, π).
Substituting the ansatz for the illiquid regime value function W we obtain that c1,∗ = x
k1(t)−πh1pi(t,π)
and after some simplifications that k1 ≡ kˆ. Moreover, the wealth-independent term h1(t, π) solves
(40).
Returning to the liquid regime, the ansatz implies that c0,∗ = x/k0(t) and
k0t log x+ h
0
t + rk
0(t)− 1 + λ01 log x[k1(t)− k0(t)]− λ01h0(t)
+ log x− log k0(t)− ρ[k0(t) log x+ h0(t)] + ξ(t, π∗) = 0.
where
ξ(t, π∗) = sup
π∈[0,1]
{
(µ − r)πk0(t)− 1
2
σ2π2k0(t) + λ01
[
k1(t) log(1− πL) + h1(t, g(π))]}.
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The terminal condition is k0(T ) = 0, h0(T ) = 0. Considering the terms multiplying log x, we find
again k0 ≡ kˆ. Thus optimal consumption in the liquid regime c0,∗ is again unaffected by liquidity
shocks. Similarly, collecting terms of Ø(1), we see that h0 solves the first-order ode
h0t − ρh0(t)− λ01h0(t) + rk0(t)− 1− log k0(t) + ξ(t, π∗) = 0.
Since this first-order ode is linear and ξ(t, π∗) is independent of h0, we can apply variation of
constants to obtain (41) and (42). Next, from equation (42) we know the optimal investment
fraction π∗ satisfies
(57) (µ− r)− σ2π∗ + λ01
[ −L
1− π∗L +
1
k0(t)
h1π(t, g(π
∗))g′(π∗)
]
= 0.
Using equation (57) we expand π∗ to the leading order for small λ01 to obtain the first half of (43).
Plugging-in this asymptotic expression for π∗ into and expanding (41) for small λ01 to the leading
order, we recover the second half of (43). 
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